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The CGIAR at a Crossroads: Assessing the role of international 




Globalization, technical change and migration are changing the dynamics of poverty and food 
production. These factors, combined with a better understanding of the nature of complex 
processes, are also changing the nature of scientific research, the roles researchers can play in 
poverty alleviation and the niches in which the CGIAR can operate. While keeping strong 
breeding and research programs, the CGIAR should devote increasing resources to better 
characterize the dynamics of poverty, redefine the networks it will use to promote the use of 
scientific information to foster innovation, link local innovators and researchers with 
international scientific networks, and help to build innovative capabilities in developing 
countries. These capabilities should refer not only to scientific research but also to new ways 
to support innovation and to design and implement poverty-alleviation programs. Finally, 
CGIAR researchers should adopt new research methods to better integrate into local and 
international innovation networks. 
1. Introduction 
The role of agriculture in development and poverty alleviation, including that of agricultural 
research, has been reevaluated in recent years (World Bank 2007). The discussion, however, 
has not yet fully addressed how globalization, migration and new technologies have changed 
the dynamics of poverty and the organization of science, and what role formal research should 
play in the new juncture. This is particularly true for the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) as exemplified by its recent external evaluation (CGIAR 
Independent Review Panel 2008) and the reform proposal (The Change Steering Team 2008). 
This paper seeks to contribute to the debate on the CGIAR’s future role by analyzing some 
key issues that have not been properly addressed in the reform process, especially the 
potential of international public goods as development tools and the roles CGIAR centers can 
play in fostering innovation. 
Poverty alleviation has two benchmarks: achieving food security and affording a healthy life. 
In the past, greater productivity of food crops resulting from input-intensive technologies was 
seen as the main tool to achieve both goals. This is no longer the case. An increasing share of 
rural households derive most of their income from off-farm sources (World Bank 2007); for 
them food security depends more on access to labor markets and the price of staples than on 
their own food production. On the other hand, higher yields can eliminate poverty for those 
subsistence farmers who can become commercial farms; only a small share of rural 
households, though, seems capable of making the transition (see section 2).  
The substantial reduction in poverty observed in the last two decades resulted from rapid 
growth enabled by integration into globalized markets and from remittances from migrants 
and not from the expansion of staples in small farms (World Bank 2005; IFAD 2008). 
Commercial agriculture played an important role in this process. Its expansion resulted from 
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the use of marketing and production technologies generated mostly by private firms and 
sometimes by NGOs. International and public research institutions contributed little to the 
process (Ekboir et al. 2009). As the limited contribution of public research to agricultural 
development became evident, donors started to question the effectiveness of their 
contributions to agricultural research, including the CGIAR and developing countries’ 
research institutions (Byerlee, Alex and Echeverria 2002).  
The innovation systems framework has enabled a better understanding of the links between 
formal research and innovation and has shown the limitations of the linear vision of science 
which provided the model for the CGIAR; the framework has also helped to identify new 
instruments to foster economic and social development2. Many countries, especially in 
Europe, and several donors have explicitly embraced the innovation systems framework as the 
cornerstone of their activities. 
For several reasons, however, the CGIAR has not been successful enough in adapting to the 
new environment (CGIAR Independent Review Panel 2008). First, in contrast to what 
happened fifty years ago, there is no clear model of what role modern technologies should 
play in development, in particular, because there are no clear recipes for development (Rodrik 
2006). Second, it has been accepted that the joint dynamics of agriculture and poverty have 
changed (see section 2), and it is not clear what role public research should now play in 
poverty alleviation given the larger range of actors participating in development and the 
increased variety of opportunities poor rural households have. Third, because the CGIAR is 
composed of a large number of actors, each with his/her own agenda, it has been difficult to 
agree on and implement substantial changes in a system with diffuse governance mechanisms 
(CGIAR Independent Review Panel 2008). Fourth, the CGIAR was justified as a source of 
international public goods. When the linear model of science was shown to be incorrect, the 
idea of scientific public goods as a source of economic growth was also questioned (see 
section 3.3). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the new dynamics of 
agriculture and poverty, especially the impacts of globalization, high value markets and 
remittances. Section 3 examines some recent advances in the literature of innovation systems 
and complexity theories, while section 4 presents a stylized picture of recent changes in 
research systems. Section 5 discusses the CGIAR’s current role; section 6 presents some ideas 
on how to adapt the system to the needs of twenty first century agriculture; and section 7 
concludes.  
2. The new dynamics of agriculture and rural poverty 
Globalization, technical change and migration have substantially transformed the joint 
dynamics of agriculture and poverty in developing countries, making some key assumptions 
that justified the creation of the CGIAR no longer valid. 
Prior to the 1980s, poverty was closely linked to agriculture. Since most countries were in the 
initial stages of urbanization and travel was difficult, farming families worked mostly in rural 
areas and derived most of their income and food from agriculture. It was only natural to 
expect that poverty alleviation and growth in agriculture-based countries would come from 
increased productivity in staples and a few export products (see, for example, World Bank 
2007). Agricultural development programs were based on the assumption that productivity 
                                               
2
 According to the linear vision of science, knowledge starts with basic research; its results are used by strategic 
and applied research, and end with development and technology transfer. It has been shown that this model only 
represents a limited range of research areas, especially in chemistry, biotechnology and pharmacology. 
 6
jumps could only come from “modern” technologies, designed by scientists and “transferred” 
by extension agents (World Bank 2006). Because insufficient access by farmers to technical 
information was seen as the greatest limitation to agricultural growth, important investments 
were made in research and extension services (Byerlee, Alex and Echeverria 2002). The 
success of the Green Revolution in South Asia was seen as confirmation of this model. It was 
not recognized until recently that the impacts of the Green Revolution could not be attributed 
only to science but to a package that included major investments in infrastructure and 
subsidized inputs and outputs (CGIAR Independent Review Panel 2008).  
After the crisis of the 1980s, most developing countries implemented structural adjustment 
programs, which included market liberalization, downsizing the public sector and opening 
new activities to the private sector (Staatz and Eicher 1998). Domestic and international 
markets became more integrated, diversified and sophisticated, which opened new 
opportunities and created new challenges for farmers in developing countries (Hellin, Lundy 
and Meijer 2009). Helped by the new institutional environment, multilateral trade agreements 
and novel technologies, commercial agriculture in developing countries grew rapidly (World 
Bank 2007). Additionally, private firms, NGOs and civil society organizations became 
important actors in development processes, competing with traditional public extension 
agencies. 
Technical change in production, post-harvest, transportation and marketing enabled the 
expansion of agricultural markets and the emergence of high value agriculture. Most 
technologies for high-value products were imported and adapted to local conditions by private 
firms or NGOs (Reardon 2005). Multinational companies sold worldwide the products they 
developed in their central laboratories, allowing commercial farmers in developing countries 
to access the latest inputs. The public research and extension institutes from developing 
countries, in general, did not participate in the expansion of the most dynamic markets, but 
some researchers participated as individuals (Ekboir et al. 2009). Although the public research 
institutes and CGIAR centers continued to work mostly in their traditional lines of research, 
some opened programs in high-value products. Many CGIAR researchers participated in 
international networks that developed important technological packages for traditional 
products (see, for example, Ekboir 2002 and Gabre-Madhin and Haggblade 2004). In other 
cases, they were instrumental in the development of niche markets (e.g., Papa Andina). Their 
contribution to poverty alleviation, however, seems to have been limited because few small 
farmers have been able to escape poverty producing cereals (Bourguignon 2006), or because 
niche markets by nature cannot be massive. In fact, it has been found that only a very small 
share of small farmers have been able to benefit in the long run from access to high value 
markets (Hellin, Lundy and Meijer 2009). The limited participation of the CGIAR and public 
research institutions in the most dynamic agricultural markets led many stakeholders to 
question their role in poverty alleviation. 
Local markets for traditional agricultural products also became integrated into international 
markets (Hellin, Lundy and Meijer 2009). Small farmers suddenly had to face foreign 
competition, even if they continued doing what they had been doing for generations. 
Profitability of traditional products fell, especially for small farmers who did not introduce 
more intensive technologies. Contrary to what was expected, many small farmers continued 
producing traditional products despite strong competition from imports. The most accepted 
explanation for this phenomenon is that poor rural families derive only a small percentage of 
their income from agriculture, with off-farm employment and remittances being the main 
sources of earnings (World Bank 2007; Taylor, Dyer and Yunez-Naude 2005). These families 
still live in the land, but farm only to secure their supply of staples or to produce products that 
cannot be easily bought and are needed for traditional foods. Thus, the price elasticity of their 
supply is very low. Higher productivity is still important for the poorest of the poor who have 
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limited insertion in labor markets. For these households, higher yields reduce food insecurity 
but it is highly unlikely that they will lift them out of poverty (Bourguignon 2006).  
Local and distant labor markets also became more integrated. Easier travel and improved 
financial services meant that people from rural areas could work in distant locations and send 
remittances back home. In fact, domestic and international migration is becoming the 
cornerstone of the livelihood strategies of many rural households (Vargas-Lundius 2004). It is 
estimated that in 2006, 150 million international migrants sent home US$300 billion (IFAD 
2008). It has been consistently found that most remittances are invested in education and 
health (i.e., in human capital that can be used in off-farm employment), housing and only a 
small proportion in expanding agricultural production (World Bank 2007; López-Córdova and 
Olmedo 2006; Barret, Reardon and Webb 2001; Davis et al. 2000). The reasons for these 
investment preferences are poorly understood but they are an indication of the limitations of 
traditional development policies (including agricultural research and extension) aimed at 
increasing the agricultural output of most poor rural households.  
3. The nature of innovation processes 
Innovation depends on the interaction of motivation and ability (Christensen, Anthony and 
Roth 2004). Globalization, technical change and better infrastructure motivate when they link 
rural agents (including farmers) to markets. But to take advantage of these opportunities, the 
agents have to develop appropriate capabilities. This section reviews the complex nature of 
innovation and innovative capabilities.  
3.1. What is a complex process? 
Complex processes are characterized by multiple and changing interactions (Crutchfield 
2003). The most relevant complex systems for the analysis of the CGIAR are formed by many 
different independent decision-makers (for example, managers, employees, clients and 
suppliers), multiple interactions, many feedback mechanisms and random processes. Such 
systems are known as complex adaptive systems (CAS) (Gunderson and Holling 2002).  
Because of its decentralized nature, no single agent can manipulate a CAS or predict how it 
will evolve in the medium or long term. Even more, the same results can be obtained with 
different interventions or the same interventions can have very different outcomes; therefore, 
new approaches are needed for planning and policy-making3. There are several methods to do 
this and discussing them exceeds the scope of this paper (for a detailed discussion see 
Crutchfield 2003; Gunderson and Holling 2002 and Axelrod and Cohen 1999). One way to 
influence a CAS is to operate on the dynamics of evolution, especially on variation and 
selection. For example, a plant breeder knows the characteristics of the parents available to 
her and selects those she hopes will pass some desired trait to their progeny (e.g. resistance to 
a given disease). In the early stages of developing a new variety, the breeder usually makes 
thousands of crosses that do not occur naturally. In other words, the breeder increases variety 
by making crosses she hopes will raise the probability of obtaining the desired result (as 
opposed to the totally random natural crosses). With artificial selection, the breeder overrides 
the natural process of selection via reproductive efficiency by selecting the progeny that 
displays the desired properties without taking into account their reproductive efficiency. 
Similar mechanisms are being successfully used to develop complex computer programs, 
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synthesize new chemical and medical compounds and develop and implement management 
strategies for large ecosystems. 
The example illustrates a key characteristic of operating on a CAS: contrary to what an 
engineer (or a researcher working with traditional methods) would do, the “solutions” to 
“problems” are obtained through a process of directed search without designing them 
intentionally. On the other hand, scientists who use a rational design approach start by 
building a detailed model of the problem, and then design a structure that can serve as a 
solution. The relative efficiency of each method depends on the complexity and stability of 
the processes upon which it operates and how much is known about it. If little is known, if it 
changes rapidly or is complex, rational design is less effective because it limits the 
exploration of the solution space and bets that the explored solution is the most effective. In 
these cases, the effectiveness of the rational design approach depends more on luck than the 
management of variety and selection approach. It has been demonstrated that the latter 
converges on an optimum at least as quickly as the rational design method (Crutchfield 2003).  
3.2. What is known about innovation? 
We define an innovation as anything new successfully introduced into an economic or social 
process. Major innovations combine a business model and a technological package (Davila, 
Epstein and Shelton 2006). Innovations that do not include both components result in minor 
improvements along an established technological trajectory.  
A consequence of our definition is that researchers do not generate innovations but 
information, either codified (e.g., a paper or blueprint), embedded (e.g., an improved seed) or 
tacit (e.g., why an experiment failed). This information only becomes an innovation when an 
agent (e.g., private firms or individual farmers) uses it to improve what s/he is doing. 
Innovators use different sources of information; most of it, however, does not originate in 
science but in everyday activities and in interactions with other actors (Faberger 2005). This 
does not mean that formal research plays no role in innovation; while it may not be 
quantitatively a dominant factor, it is qualitatively essential because it opens new 
technological trajectories.  
Innovative capabilities depend on the innovators’ absorptive capabilities, i.e., on their ability 
to use information (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Rapid adoption of new technologies is not 
necessarily associated with large expenditures on research and extension, but with the 
development of absorptive capabilities (Ekboir et al. 2009). For this reason, the dynamics of 
innovation does not depend on the agents at the forefront of research and technology 
development, but on the innovative capabilities of the majority of agents. In other words, it is 
more important to have many agents searching for and using existing information than to have 
a few sophisticated research institutes in a static society.  
Because of the exploding volume of information and the increasing complexity of 
innovations, no agent commands all the resources needed to innovate; therefore, innovators 
integrate into networks (Powell and Grodal 2005). The dynamics of innovation networks 
depend on their complexity and maturity. For simple innovations or mature markets, the 
networks are loose and members interact mostly formally or through markets because each 
actor understands the needs of other actors. These networks have been the model for most 
agricultural programs, including the CGIAR. On the other hand, in the case of new or 
complex innovations, members interact often and informally to overcome unforeseen 
obstacles and to build confidence. The need for intense interactions arises because generalized 
uncertainty about the new technologies and their market potential prevents effective 
contracting (Christensen, Anthony and Roth 2004).  
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The effectiveness of innovation networks depends on their ability to facilitate the search for 
and exchange of information and resources. Technically, this is known as the network’s 
navigability. Navigability depends on the existence of “central” actors (e.g., highly connected 
actors) interacting among them, which, in turn connect different clusters of network members. 
It has been shown that a few central actors can greatly increase the network’s navigability 
(Watts 1999).  
The emergence and consolidation of innovation networks depends on a number of factors, 
among which a catalyzing agent is one of the most important (Ekboir 2002). This agent 
induces other partners to invest time and resources in the network. Once the network is 
consolidated, the importance of the catalyzing agents diminishes, because other actors are 
more willing to participate when the benefits of participation become clearer, and the 
interaction rules are known to all partners. The role of the catalyzing agent is different from 
that of linking agents. The catalyzing agent facilitates the emergence of the network while the 
linking agent increases the connectivity, even in mature networks. While the catalyzing agent 
is essential in the early life of a network, the linking agents are important through the whole 
process. 
3.3. The nature of organizational innovative capabilities 
Organizational capabilities are important because actors usually innovate by interacting in 
formal or informal networks. These capabilities cannot be bought or easily copied; thus, they 
have to be built with sustained investments, selection of appropriate specialists and project 
leaders, and strong commitment by the partners (Christensen, Anthony and Roth 2004). 
Organizational capabilities are embedded in individuals and in the organization’s technology, 
structure, strategies, routines, culture and coordination procedures (Argote and Darr 2000). 
Even though innovative organizations must have at least a few innovative individuals, this is 
not required for the vast majority of its members; what is required is that the organizations 
create an environment in which innovative individuals can express their abilities and 
influence other members (Christensen, Anthony and Roth 2004). 
Organizations depend on their innovative capabilities to respond to changes in the 
technological, economic and social environments. Innovative capabilities are built by 
learning, i.e., by creating knowledge. The specialized literature differentiates between 
information and knowledge (Quantas 2002). Information is organized data (e.g., published 
materials, blueprints or physical objects), while knowledge is the use of the information to 
create unique interpretations of reality. Because of its personal nature, two actors can learn 
different things from the same information, or the same thing from different types of 
information. Knowledge is very difficult to share while information can be disseminated quite 
easily.  
Because the information stock is complex, diverse, short-lived and fast-growing, learning 
requires strong capabilities to search for useful information and to digest it to create 
knowledge (Ekboir et al. 2009). These absorptive capabilities depend on exogenous and 
endogenous factors. Economic stability, development, the nature of competition and the 
interactions between firms and research institutes are important exogenous factors; the 
endogenous factors include organizational cultures, investments made in the search for and 
adaptation of information, quality of the personnel and mechanisms to socialize knowledge. 
The understanding of organizational innovative capabilities has major consequences for the 
nature and role of the CGIAR. One of the major justifications for its existence has been the 
generation of international public goods (Alston, Dehmer and Pardey 2006; CGIAR 2008 and 
2006). The public goods generated by the CGIAR are technical information, either embodied 
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(e.g., seeds), or disembodied (e.g., publications and agronomic recommendations)4. Pure 
public goods do not require any special effort or skill on the side of the receiver of the 
services of the goods (Faberger 2005). But to use technical information, innovators have to 
invest substantial resources to develop absorptive capabilities. In other words, while 
information may be free, its use is not; spillovers only occur when agents have invested in 
their absorptive capabilities.  
4. Changes in the organization of science 
Globalization, new regulations and advanced technologies are redefining the international 
research environment. Increasing interdependence between knowledge-based economies 
implies an ever-expanding international flow of technology, scientific knowledge and know-
how. The better understanding of complex systems and the development of methods to 
operate on them are also changing the organization of science in four ways. First, the linear 
vision of science highlighted the preeminence of theoretical research over applied work. The 
examples presented in section 3.1 show that in fact, both approaches are complementary. 
Even more, overreliance on theoretical work in a CAS can actually be a hindrance, because it 
constrains the exploration of new research approaches and potential solutions.  
Second, research systems must be flexible to react to new problems and opportunities. But 
individual institutions cannot react fast enough because of inertias (Christensen, Anthony and 
Roth 2004). Flexibility can only be achieved with enough variation in the system. In other 
words, it is necessary to have a system with many good institutions that can form multi-
institutional teams to solve emerging problems; in fact, this has been one of the major 
strengths of the American research system (Kraemer 2006), and one of the major problems 
the CGIAR faces (see section 5). Third, effective research systems resulted when researchers 
interacted closely with innovative agents (Faberger 2005), but the CGIAR has had problems 
developing stable partnerships with others, beyond those with National Agricultural Research 
Institutes (NARIs). 
Fourth, formal research has traditionally been conducted by stable teams within an institution 
and discipline; Gibbons et al. (1994) called this organization the mode 1 of research. This 
mode describes the CGIAR in its early days, except that instead of just one institution, the 
centers coordinated breeding networks. In mode 2, teams are multidisciplinary, multi-
institutional (often involving researchers from the public and private sectors and other 
stakeholders), increasingly distributed in distant locations and relatively ephemeral, as they 
are formed to respond to specific issues. Action-research is an example of mode 2 research in 
which farmers and other actors actively participate in the organization and implementation of 
projects.  
The flexible organization that results from mode 2 allows innovators and research institutions 
to react rapidly to emerging technological needs or opportunities. It must be stressed that the 
main difference between modes 1 and 2 of research is not what is researched but how it is 
done.  How to switch to mode 2 is the most important challenge the CGIAR faces today. 
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5. A review of the CGIAR 
The original design of the CGIAR reflected the success of the Green Revolution, the fact that 
most of the poor lived off of agriculture (see section 2), agricultural technology polices 
revolving around NARIs and a linear vision of science. In its early years, the CGIAR had a 
very clear and narrow goal: to stave off hunger by increasing the productivity of staples in 
small farms (Alston, Dehmer and Pardey 2006). Thus, it gave highest priority to breeding 
improved varieties of cereals. In the 1970s, about two-thirds of CGIAR resources were 
allocated to research on rice, wheat and maize. High priority was later given to improving the 
quality of diets through research on food legumes and ruminant livestock (Anderson 1998). 
The initial success of the CGIAR resulted from the collective effort of high quality 
researchers working on a narrowly focused problem (i.e., plant breeding) and policymakers 
providing the economic incentives to induce adoption (CGIAR 2008). In this sense, the 
CGIAR in its early days repeated the formula that made the US research system highly 
effective (Kraemer 2006) and was similar to other successful programs, such as 
SEMATECH5.  
Following the linear vision, the first CGIAR centers were the central nodes of breeding 
networks that also included the NARIs selecting locally adapted varieties, extension services 
taking the seeds to the farmers and sometimes policy makers providing economic incentives 
to induce adoption. In 1971 the donors and centers expanded their activities under six broad 
program thrusts: research to increase productivity of food production; management of natural 
resources; assisting countries in designing and implementing food, agricultural and research 
policies; capacity building by training and strengthening national agricultural research 
systems (NARS); germplasm conservation by collecting and classifying genetic resources and 
maintaining genebanks and other means of conservation; and building linkages between 
NARIs and other components of the international agricultural research system (Anderson 
1998).  
The new activities were added with little consideration for what these changes meant for the 
type of science the CGIAR should conduct or how it should be carried out. Several factors 
reduced the effectiveness of the expanded mandate. First, in contrast with the initial focused 
mission, the new objectives were more diffused and spread the resources over more activities. 
Second, breeding is essentially different from research in other agricultural fields. Breeding 
relied on international networks that facilitated exchanges of germplasm; in other words, they 
increased diversity combined with an effective selection mechanism. The other activities did 
not form similar global networks and worked with a smaller set of partners because their 
research was more location-specific, and no agreement emerged on what were the best 
methods to study those topics. Additionally, while the CGIAR centers could find good 
partners for breeding in some NARIs, it was more difficult to find them in other research 
areas. Finally, it was not clear what advantage international researchers had in more location-
specific research (CGIAR 2006).  
Third, in the 1980s research policies in developed countries underwent a major transformation 
which included a shift from “blind” funding of research institutions to project funding where 
policymakers set more specific targets; in other words, policymakers reduced their support for 
academic (i.e., curiosity-oriented) research and increased it for research oriented to social and 
economic needs (Lepori et al. 2007). This change was accompanied by a demand for research 
institutions to show the impacts of their activities, as evidenced by the discussions that 
followed the 1993 US Government Performance and Results Act (Kraemer 2006). The 
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CGIAR also followed this path, and, in the mid-1990s began to transform itself into an 
output- and impact driven system (Kassam 2006). CGIAR funders as well followed these 
trends, which increased the center’s transaction costs, hampered long terms research programs 
(CGIAR Independent Review Panel 2008) and forced the centers to commit important 
resources to demonstrate their impact (Bellon et al. 2006); the new approach resulted in a 
number of impact studies (see, for example Byerlee and Moya 1993 and Evenson and Gollin 
2001).  
In the 1980s and 1990s, the conceptual model of research systems in developing countries 
underwent major changes. The concept of the NARIs was replaced by the NARS, which also 
included universities and other agricultural research institutions; in the 1990s the NARS was 
replaced by the Agricultural Knowledge and Information System (AKIS) which included 
research, education and extension (Byerlee, Alex and Echeverria 2002). While these models 
still reflected the linear vision of science, they showed that the CGIAR had to develop new 
interactions with a more diverse set of partners, many of which had weak research capabilities 
(see, for example, Spielman et al. 2008). In parallel, private firms and NGOs started to 
develop commercial agriculture, usually importing technical and scientific information. In the 
2000s, the concept of the Agricultural Innovation System began to gain acceptance; the main 
consequence of this transition was that public researchers in national or international centers 
were no longer seen as the central actors of agricultural growth, but just another source of 
information or a potential partner in innovation networks. 
Several stakeholders criticized the NARS for their lack of participation in the emergence of 
high-value markets and the failure of modern seeds to eradicate poverty. This led to a 
substantial downsizing or closure of public research and extension institutions (Byerlee, Alex 
and Echeverria 2002). The CGIAR centers found that they could no longer rely exclusively on 
weakened traditional partners, and started to work with private firms and NGOs.  
In these years, the CGIAR’s mandate expanded even more. The new activities included 
managing research networks to facilitate research performed by others, some in conjunction 
with CGIAR centers (Plucknett, Smith, and Özgediz 1990); rehabilitating seed stocks in 
nature- or war-ravaged countries; promoting no-till, and developing niche markets. Because 
the expanded mandate had to be met with reduced budgets, breeding programs were further 
scaled back (Alston, Dehmer and Pardey 2006). The expansion in the number and types of 
potential partners the centers could work with made most of their networks even more 
diffused and required developing new types of capabilities and interactions. Some of these 
activities have been branded “development less directly related to research” (Alston Dehmer 
and Pardey 2006, pp. 324). It should be noted, though, that this statement reflects a mode 1 
vision; if properly conducted, these activities could involve new approaches to mode 2 
research (for example, action-research or manipulation of variation and selection as explained 
in section 3.1). 
After realizing the potential of high value agriculture in poverty alleviation, several centers 
started to work on diversification and development of niche markets to the point that high 
value agriculture became one of the CGIAR’s priorities (CGIAR 2005). This type of work, 
however, differs greatly from that done on staples and livestock. Because high value markets 
are more complex, newer and fast changing, development of the business model is, at least, as 
important as the agronomic package (Reardon 2005). When their mandate committed them to 
work in low value products (e.g., maize or rice), some centers explored the use of their crops 
as inputs in the production of high value products. But the CGIAR centers did not have the 
expertise to develop agricultural value chains or to research these topics (Science Council 
Secretariat 2007). Over time, a few centers (e.g., CIP and CIAT) developed some of these 
capabilities, but, then, they became more similar to NGOs and increasingly different from 
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traditional research centers. This does not mean that these activities should not be done, but it 
is not clear what advantage the CGIAR has in this area relative to specialized NGOs (e.g., 
Technoserve6) or universities with strong international programs such as Michigan State 
University or Wageningen. 
The main challenge agricultural research in the CGIAR now faces is that the networks it 
formed in the past are no longer viable because most NARIs have weakened, and the new 
partnerships that need to be created require new models of science, new partners and new 
patterns of interaction. However, because of the complexity of innovation processes and the 
rapid changes science is going through, there are no clear recipes for how to build these 
partnerships. Complexity theories and the innovations systems framework can provide 
guidance on how to approach the problem (see below). 
Social science (including economics) has always played a subordinate role in the system. 
Initially, these programs were created to study the factors that determined farmers’ adoption 
of improved varieties (Cernea 2006). When funding declined in the late 1980s, the priority 
shifted to measuring the centers’ impact to justify their work to the donors (Bellon et al. 
2006). In recent years, several centers have started programs to analyze the nature of 
agricultural innovations, but these efforts are dispersed and have not reached a critical mass 
(e.g., CIP, IFPRI and ILRI). In addition, learning how to promote innovation among small 
farmers requires new research routines (Ekboir et al. 2009), and few centers have developed 
expertise in them. 
The CGIAR’s two specialized social sciences centers (ISNAR and IFPRI) require special 
consideration. ISNAR was mandated with helping NARS; as the vision of the role of NARS 
in development changed, ISNAR found it difficult to define a niche that was also acceptable 
to donors and important stakeholders (Ozgediz and MacNeil 2006). Recognizing the new 
environment, ISNAR started to explore the concept of innovation systems; this new direction, 
however, was strongly criticized by the CGIAR Technical Advisory Committee and the 
External Program and Management Review, and contributed to its closure as an independent 
centre (ISNAR 2002)7. 
This criticism, however, reflected the linear vision of science, and a lack of understanding of 
the emerging needs of innovation networks in developing countries. Although NARS 
weakened, the importance of other actors in the innovation system increased (see sections 2 
and 3). These actors, including the international centers and the CGIAR itself, also needed 
support to strengthen their capabilities to manage innovation processes and to develop 
instruments appropriate for the new economic and social environment. Most organizations, 
however, have great difficulties in developing new capabilities on their own (Christensen and 
Raynor 2003; Smit 2007). To overcome these hurdles, the specialized literature recommends 
creating bridging structures that help organizations find useful information, mediate between 
researchers and other areas of the network and identify internal and external barriers to 
innovation (Davila, Epstein and Shelton 2006). ISNAR was starting to work along these lines 
when it was transformed into an IFPRI program.  
IFPRI was created to research food policies and provide policy advice. From its beginnings, it 
developed a culture that valued publications in scholarly journals above more applied work 
and interactions with policymakers in developing countries. Because many studies contained 
policy lessons applicable to several countries, they were branded as international public 
                                               
6
 TechnoServe helps entrepreneurial men and women in poor areas of the developing world to build businesses 
that create income, opportunity and economic growth for their families, their communities and their countries. 
(Source: http://www.technoserve.org)  
7
 It must be also recognized that serious management problems contributed to ISNAR’s closure (ISNAR 2002). 
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goods, but they are no different from many papers published by other international 
organizations, think tanks or universities. For most of its life, IFPRI established weak links 
with other CGIAR centers and policymakers in developing countries and could have been a 
department in a good university. While in recent years IFPRI has introduced new programs 
with input from social sciences other than economics, the center still has an academic culture 
in accordance with the linear vision of science (see section 4).  
Additionally, IFPRI’s culture resulted in a narrow exploration of policy alternatives and 
overreliance on a restricted theoretical body (i.e., essentially microeconomic theory and 
quantitative methods). For example, its research policy recommendations have not evolved in 
the last twenty years (see, for example, Alston, Dehmer and Pardey 2006), and are based on 
the linear vision of science and mechanistic models (e.g., DREAM8). In other cases, the 
policy recommendations are based on uncorroborated assumptions. For example, Ruben and 
Pender (2004) assert the existence of diminishing returns to investments in research. 
Diminishing returns are assumed in static microeconomic models in order to derive an 
analytical solution. In dynamic, complex models, however, there is no reason to assume 
diminishing returns. Because the interaction between positive and negative feedback loops is 
continuous and changing, returns can alternatively be increasing and decreasing (Holling, 
Gunderson and Ludwig 2002).  
In 2003 the CGIAR launched its first Challenge program, a new approach to building 
partnerships. Challenge programs provided a flexible mechanism to structure 
multidisciplinary, inter-institutional teams to address specific issues. If properly managed, 
they could have been the basis for conducting mode 2 research. Two reviews by the Science 
Council and the CGIAR Secretariat (Science Council 2007 and 2004) and the recent 
independent review (CGIAR 2008), however, indicate that the CGIAR still evaluates the 
Challenge Programs from a linear perspective.  
In 2004 the Science Council was given more power to oversee the work of the centers, 
especially, setting the system’s priorities (CGIAR 2005). In the following years it tried to 
align the centers’ activities with these priorities. The urgency to align the centers and 
Challenge programs was reiterated in the system’s independent review (CGIAR Independent 
Review Panel 2008). A similar strict alignment could have serious consequences in the future 
CGIAR. As was explained in section 3.1, complex processes are difficult to understand and 
predict. Therefore, instead of setting clearly defined strategies and priorities, actors operating 
in such environments should use learning strategies to identify emerging trends and to explore 
alternative solutions. Fifteen independent but coordinated centers can be a very effective 
structure to implement a strategy of decentralized experimentation with centralized learning. 
In fact, some centers have already implemented innovative projects in response to identified 
opportunities (for example, CIMMYT’s work on no-till); what the system lacks is an effective 
and flexible structure to learn from these projects.  
An additional problem is that the model of research behind the priorities set by the Science 
Council still reflected a linear vision of science (see Science Council 2005) and seem to have 
been an important input in the definition of potential research areas for the redesigned 
CGIAR. Forcing the centers to revert to such a model would isolate them even more from 
innovation networks and hamper innovation. This problem is compounded by the 
performance measurement system which evaluates the centers by their achievement of 
predetermined goals (Science Council Secretariat 2006). The literature on contracts (MacLeod 
2007) and innovation management (Davila, Epstein and Shelton 2006) have shown that 
                                               
8
 DREAM, or Dynamic Research Evaluation for Management, is a tool for evaluating the effects of agricultural 
R&D (Source: http://www.ifpri.org/dream.htm)  
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predetermined goals and incentives induce actors to engage in minor innovations along 
known technological paths. To foster the development of major innovations, the optimal 
policy is a system that rewards past performance based on a clear understanding of the drivers 
of innovation (MacLeod 2007). 
6. Assessing the CGIAR reform process from an innovation 
systems perspective 
The reform process currently under implementation is based on the assumption that public 
goods can make a positive contribution to poverty alleviation and the sustainable use of 
natural resources. The public good the CGIAR produces is scientific information, either 
embedded in seeds or disembodied as papers and recommendations9. This information, 
however, is useful only if poor farmers have the capabilities to find it and absorb it (see 
section 3). For this to happen, two conditions are needed. First, poor farmers have to be 
willing to become commercial farmers and they have to be capable of doing it. As was shown 
in section 2, however, there are clear indications that many poor rural households prefer not to 
become commercial farmers. Therefore, the CGIAR should clearly define what its poverty 
alleviation goals are: helping the poorest of the poor to increase food security, assisting poor 
farmers who have the potential to become commercial farmers, supporting commercial 
farmers so that they create employment and increase food availability or all of them. Once the 
target population is identified, appropriate approaches to reach it must be developed. Given 
the complexity of poverty alleviation, however, no clear recipes to do this will ever exist and 
appropriate learning mechanisms should be created (see below). 
The second condition is that researchers address farmers’ needs or technical opportunities 
with methods that facilitate absorption. A crucial component of these methods should be that 
both farmers and researchers participate in innovation networks that foster information 
sharing, so that researchers can understand the farmers’ operating conditions and the farmers 
can access scientific information. Meeting these two conditions requires less consideration to 
what is researched and more to how the research is done, especially, how researchers interact 
with stakeholders.  
The reform proposal is based on two key principles about how research should be conducted: 
consolidation of research activities in a few programs and defining accountabilities through 
program performance contracts. The effectiveness of these changes will depend on how they 
are implemented. As was explained in section 3, complex processes are characterized by 
unforeseen outcomes and constantly evolving interactions; even more, because causalities are 
non-linear, it is difficult to attribute outcomes to particular interventions. Contracting in such 
contexts is extremely difficult because there is no clear link between performance and 
outcomes (MacLeod 2007; Sykuta and Parcel 2003). Even more, operating in complex 
environments requires evolutionary approaches and strong learning mechanisms (Crutchfield 
2003). In other words, for the contracts to be effective, they will have to be flexible and 
reviewed often to allow exploration of alternative approaches.  
The CGIAR’s new structure does not include a mechanism for institutional learning. The 
Independent Science and Partnership Council (ISPC) is expected to provide core scientific 
advice related to system strategy, priorities and assessment of scientific quality and impacts of 
CGIAR-led research but is not expected to interact continuously with the centers’ senior 
management and researchers to assess new research methods, facilitate information sharing 
                                               
9
 The CGIAR also conducts other activities that are not public goods such as information portals, direct support 
and training. Most documents, however, still justify the system as a source of international public goods.   
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and the implementation of pilot-projects. Even more, the advice provided by the ISPC will 
still have to be absorbed by the CGIAR, and for this to be successful the system should 
develop absorptive capabilities.  
It is unlikely that the system will be able to develop absorptive capabilities without a 
sustained effort. To build these capabilities, the specialized literature recommends creating 
dedicated, permanent structures for organizational learning with strong support from the top 
management (Smit 2007; Davila, Epstein and Shelton 2006; Christensen, Roth and Anthony 
2004). Recently, some donors (e.g., DFID and IDRC) and centers started to explore programs 
to develop innovation capabilities (e.g., the intercenter ILAC Initiative hosted by Bioversity), 
but these efforts have been isolated and have not been sufficiently backed by the CGIAR and 
centers’ authorities. 
Institutional learning structures on their own are unlikely to provide enough flexibility to 
attain the systems’ goals. Individual institutions (including the CGIAR centers) usually cannot 
change fast enough to address emergent issues (Christensen, Roth and Anthony 2004), but a 
diversified, multi-institutional system can (Kramer 2006). In other words, the CGIAR should 
tap more into good researchers from a wide range of institutions that manage programs that 
may be outside the centers’ capabilities and narrow mandates. The key for such strategy is a 
strong executive office that can recognize problems, allocate resources and identify actors 
(including researchers) that can contribute essential assets. Such strategy could be played by a 
strong CGIAR Consortium Office that is not restricted to manage center performance 
agreements. 
Effective institutional learning strategies require appropriate planning that recognizes the 
complexity of the system’s mandate and that most problems can be solved with different 
interventions. Rigid priority setting would miss emerging issues and reduce the exploration of 
alternative solutions. Designing flexible planning strategies and incentive systems that can 
deal with complexity, however, is beyond the scope of this paper; the interested reader should 
consult Christensen, Anthony and Roth (2004) and Axelrod and Cohen (1999). 
The innovation systems framework can also help to identify other actions the international 
centers could undertake in addition to mode 1 research (i.e., production of international public 
goods). Given the increasing complexity of innovation and research processes, the centers 
could become catalyzing and linking agents in global networks. Thanks to their global 
connections, the centers can help to identify successful experiences in many countries, link 
innovators with sources of scientific and technical information in distant locations (in 
particular, advanced research institutions), use action-research to help adapt foreign 
experiences to local conditions and promote the emergence of global research networks. In 
this way, the CGIAR would become a central node of a system of decentralized 
experimentation with centralized learning. An example of such work was the development of 
a no-till planter for small farmers involving actors in Bolivia and India, process in which 
CIMMYT played a key role (Ekboir 2002). These activities should not be evaluated with 
traditional research indicators such as peer reviewed publications, but rather by their 
contribution to the consolidation of networks and to building absorptive capabilities of 
innovative agents. Social Network Analysis and new approaches to performance assessment 
can be used to develop appropriate indicators (see, for example, Spitzer 2007). 
The exploration should also include the expansion of traditional breeding networks. Sixty 
years ago, these networks were centered in the CGIAR, and included mainly public and some 
private breeding programs, seed companies and extension services. Today, the public actors in 
developing countries have seriously weakened, leaving the CGIAR without its main partners. 
While new partnerships are emerging (in particular with small seed companies and NGOs), 
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the breeding programs should explore more actively novel arrangements to better support the 
diffusion of improved seeds.  
Finally, the role of social research in the CGIAR should be reevaluated. Many centers do not 
have a critical mass of social scientists; even more, the number of scientists has been falling 
and they were never fully integrated into the centers core activities (Cerenea 2006). Social 
scientists from all centers could strengthen their collaborations to achieve critical mass for the 
creation of a learning structure to explore new ways to a) foster the emergence of innovation 
networks that involve ARIs and developing countries teams and identify the roles the 
international centers should play in them, b) promote institutional change in their centers, c) 
help the centers’ researchers from other disciplines to shift to mode 2 research; and d) given 
the failure of traditional training programs to build lasting capabilities in the public sector, 
build the capabilities of other actors in innovation systems. A research program to better 
understand the joint dynamics of agriculture, globalization and migration to redefine the 
CGIAR’s role in poverty alleviation should also be established.  
7. Final remarks  
The dynamics of development and poverty are rapidly changing due to globalization, 
migration and technical change. In the last two decades, many poor rural households have 
diversified their livelihood strategies, seeking more off-farm income and high value 
agriculture over increased production of low value products. Most of the technologies used in 
high value agriculture were developed by private firms and distributed by the private sector or 
NGOs; public research and extension institutions had very limited participation in the most 
dynamic markets. Additionally, several studies have found that growth is the most effective 
way to reduce poverty, which questions the strategy of supporting low value agriculture by 
small farmers as a development instrument.  
These facts are starting to change the perception of the effectiveness of traditional 
development policies, including the role agricultural research should play in poverty 
alleviation. In particular, the concept of innovation is replacing the traditional research and 
extension continuum. Innovations are developed by networks that include private firms, 
farmers, technical advisers and, in some cases, researchers; in fact, most innovations do not 
originate in formal research but in economic or social processes. The networks’ ability to 
innovate depends, among other factors, on their absorptive capabilities, i.e., their ability to 
search for and use existing information, whether it is scientific, commercial or organizational. 
The innovation systems framework questions the traditional role assigned to the CGIAR, i.e., 
the production of international public goods. The information generated by the international 
research centers can only be used by those actors that have invested to build their absorptive 
capabilities. In other words, while the information is free, its use is not. This observation 
helps to explain the limited expansion of agriculture in poor households despite the fact that 
many of them receive remittances from migrants.  
The CGIAR defines itself not just as a technical but rather as a development research 
institution (Cernea 2006). To fulfill this vision, the system will have to adapt to the new 
socioeconomic environment, facilitating the interaction between global research and local 
innovation networks, and helping innovation networks to access technical information and to 
create it when it is lacking, in other words, strengthening its role as a bridging agent. It will 
also have to expand the centers’ flexibility, so that they can explore new instruments to foster 
innovation. 
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